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A double-edged sword:  

















This paper derives the relationship between central bank interest rates and exchange rates 
under a capital control regime. Higher interest rate may strengthen the currency by 
reducing consumption and imports and by inducing foreign owners of local currency 
assets not to sell local currency off shore. There is also an effect that goes in the opposite 
direction: Higher interest rates increase the flow of interest income to foreigners through 
the current account which makes the exchange rate fall. The historical financial crisis 
now under way in Iceland provides excellent testing grounds for the analysis. Overall, the 
experience does not suggest that cutting interest rates moderately from a very high level 
is likely to make a currency depreciate in a capital control regime but highlights the 
importance of effective enforcing of the controls.  
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In recent years many countries have experienced an inflow of foreign capital driven by 
the carry trade. Examples include Australia, Iceland and Turkey. A rapid unwinding of 
the carry trade can have disastrous consequences, as experienced by Iceland in the fall of 
2008 where the unwinding of the carry trade led to a collapse of the currency and a 
financial crisis when the country’s banking system collapsed and a large fraction of the 
business sector became insolvent.
1 One possible response to the unwinding is to impose 
capital controls that keep the current account open and allow the flow of interest income 
to be converted into foreign currency.
2 This was the measure recommended by the IMF 
in Iceland following the collapse of its financial system in October 2008. More 
controversially, the Fund recommended that the capital controls be supported by high 
central bank interest rates, which were raised to 18% before the programme was 
commenced. The question addressed in this short note is to what extent the policy of high 
interest rates really helps support the exchange rate when capital controls are in place.  
The rationale for keeping interest rates high alongside the capital controls rests 
mainly on the premise that a high rate of return on domestic-currency financial assets will 
discourage investors from exploring ways of getting around the controls, i.e. by finding 
local exporters willing to buy the local currency for foreign exchange in the off-shore 
currency market. There are, of course, also the prospects of relaxing the controls. 
However, it is clear that this is only the case if higher domestic interest rates translate into 
higher interest income measured in foreign currency. This can be demonstrated not to be 
always the case. Interestingly, high interest rates also have the effect of weakening the 
exchange rate by creating a flow of interest payments through the current account.  
  The empirical work on the effect of high interest rates on exchange rates during 
financial crisis does not lend strong support to the argument that high interest rates 
defend the value of the currency. Caporale et al. (2005), amongst others, find that while 
tight monetary policy boosts the exchange rate during normal periods, it weakened it 
during the Asian crisis in the later 1990s. Goldfajn and Gupta (2003) analyse a large 
dataset of currency crises in eighty countries for the period 1980-1998 in order to explore 
                                                 
1 For a recent survey of the macroeconomic consequences of financial crises, see Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009). On sudden stops, see Calvo et al. (2006). For an account of the turmoil in Iceland, see Danielsson 
and Zoega (2009). 
2 See Ariyoshi (2000) for a review of different countries’ experience with capital controls, including those 
in East Asia in the late 1990s.  3
whether high interest rates are successful in reversing currency undervaluation in the 
aftermath of a currency crisis. They find that this is so except when the economy also 
faces a banking crisis, in which case the results are not robust. Flood and Jeanne (2005) 
derive a model that shows that an interest rate defence of a fixed exchange rate regime 
can prove ineffective if accompanied by an unsound fiscal policy because the high 
interest rates will be perceived to have a detrimental effect on the public finances which 
weakens the currency. There are few studies of the effect of high interest rates under a 
regime of capital controls.  
The demonstration will first be carried out under the assumption of no leakages. 
Thereafter the role of leakages will be explored before incorporating the effects into a 
simple macroeconomic model, which captures the different links between the policy rate 
and the exchange rate. The final section describes the effect of recent interest rate 
reductions in Iceland on the on-shore and the off-shore exchange rate in light of the 
earlier discussion. 
 
1. The case of no leakages 
Assume that the foreign owners of domestic currency assets are concerned about their 
interest income measured in foreign currency, iED where i is the rate of interest, E is the 
nominal exchange rate measured as the foreign-currency price of one unit of local 
currency, so that an increase in E means appreciation, and D is the stock of foreign-
owned assets measured in domestic currency. Prices at home and abroad are fixed and 
assumed to equal one so that E is also the real exchange rate. These investors will benefit 
from both higher interest rates i as well as a higher exchange rate E. They will not benefit 
from an interest rate rise if this is offset by a large depreciation of the domestic currency. 
It follows that one can derive an iso-interest curve that gives all combinations of i and E 
that the foreign investor is indifferent between. Taking the total differential of iED gives 




=− <                                                                 (1) 
The equation defines a downward-sloping, strictly convex iso-interest curve in the 
exchange rate/interest rate space.  4
The feasible combinations of exchange rates and interest rates under a capital control 
regime are given by the current account balance, 
() () iED EX E M E =−                                         (2) 
The interest payments measured in foreign exchange have to equal the excess of foreign-
exchange export earnings and the cost of imports. An appreciation of the currency gives 
lower export volumes, XE(E)<0, and higher import volumes, ME(E)>0.
3  
Assume that imports become more sensitive to changes in exchange rates as their 
volumes increase: that is when the exchange rate rises, MEE(E)>0, while the sensitivity of 
exports with respect to exchange rates in a resource-based economy does not depend on 
the volume of exports, XEE(E)=0. Conversely, when the currency depreciates, imports fall, 
but consecutive depreciations have a smaller effect on imports because initially 
consumers reduce their consumption of the more price-elastic imports – cars, consumer 
durables and so forth – making their consumption basket gradually more price-inelastic. 
Even a very large depreciation will not dissuade consumers from using some imported 
food, oil and medication; the elasticity of imports becomes very small. 
Taking the total differential of equation (2) gives a current-account constraint that 
reflects all the combinations of E and i that make the current account balanced. The slope 
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                                     (3)     
which is negatively sloped as long as 
1 XM ee +>                                                               (4) 
where  () () XE eE X E X E =−  and  () () () () ME e E M E iD M E iED =+ +  are  the 
elasticities of exports and imports (plus interest payments on domestic-currency assets to 
                                                 
3 Note that leakages do not occur, by assumption, so that the appreciation does not have the effect of 
increasing leaks by making it more tempting for exporters to sell their foreign currency at the lower off-
shore rate nor does it reduce leaks by making it less tempting for the foreign investors to find these 
exporters in the off-shore market. 
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foreigners) with respect to the exchange rate. The Marshall-Lerner condition is thus 
necessary and sufficient for dE/di<0.  
Clearly, a depreciation will raise exports and lower imports to enable the transfer of 
resources to pay the interest on the debt but the depreciation will also reduce the foreign 
currency income from exports – and lower the foreign currency value of interest 
payments – requiring the elasticities to be large enough to offset this effect. This effect is 
decreasing in the stock of debt so that lower elasticities suffice when debt D is very high.
4 
The tangency between the iso-interest curve and the current-account constraint – 
given by the equality of the slopes of the two shown in equations (1) and (3) – gives 
X+EXE-ME=0. Dividing by X yields 
() () () () () 1 EE EX E X E EM E M E iED −+ + =                                    (5) 
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Equation (6) defines a maximum if, as assumed, XEE=0 and MEE>0, since the second-
order condition is: 2          0 . The optimum for the foreign investor is shown in 
Figure 1 as point F. The current account is balanced and the interest income in foreign 
currencies is maximized. 
The maximization of interest income of foreign investors is not desirable from the 
viewpoint of local authorities. These may want to maximize the foreign-currency value of 
domestic output net of interest payments to foreigners; EYi E D − . This gives upward-
sloping iso-income curves, higher interest payments have to be met by a higher exchange 
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which translates into 
1
2 EE E XM i D EM + −> . Since     0  and      0  it follows that as i gets large, 
the    term becomes small.   6
The local authorities may hence prefer point L since in the absence of leakages, there is 
no reason for them to offer positive interest rates.
5  However, the prospects of the 
relaxation of capital controls calls for higher interest rates as does a concern for 
maintaining credibility in international financial markets. In addition, lowering rates may 
weaken the capital controls by inducing foreign investors to buy foreign currency off 
shore. 
 
2. Leakages introduced 
 
Allowing for leakages, the flow of export revenue into the on-shore foreign exchange 
market depends on the difference between the on-shore and the off-shore exchange rates. 
The typical exporting firm maximizes its domestic currency profits, defined as the sum of 
domestic currency revenue on shore and off shore net of the expected cost of being 
caught evading the capital controls.  






L is the volume of exports appearing in the on-
shore export market and     0  and     0 . The expected profits in units of output are 




LL L L e
XX X t X Xt X X
E
π ⎡⎤ =+ − −− + − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
                             (8)                                       
where e is the off-shore exchange rate and E the on-shore exchange rate as before. The 
volume X
L that shows up in the on-shore market generates less revenue – in terms of 
domestic output – than that which shows up in the off-shore market. Imagine that each 
unit of exports generates e units of foreign currency in the off-shore market but then this 
is bought back in using the on-shore market at a higher exchange rate so that the revenue 
coming from exports through the on-shore market is lower per unit of output sold than 
that coming from the off-shore market since e<E. It follows that exporting firms will lose 
from buying the domestic currency on-shore where it is more expensive. However, 
buying on shore will lower the expected costs of detection.  
                                                 









The first-order condition with respect to X
L gives exports traded in the off-shore 
market as a positive function of the difference between the on-shore and the off-shore 
exchange rate and a negative function of the intensity of monitoring of the capital 
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  The on-shore exchange rate is determined so as to generate a balanced current 
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                               (10) 
An increase in the exchange rate differential – making the currency relatively more 
expensive on shore – will increase leakages and lower X
L while an increase in monitoring 
t0 and t1 will raise X
L by increasing the likelihood that violations of the capital controls 
will be detected. It follows that greater enforcing of the controls will strengthen the 
exchange rate while an off-shore depreciation will weaken it by encouraging local 
exporters to buy domestic currency off shore. 
The next equation sets the returns to staying in the domestic-currency asset equal to 
that of exiting the currency off shore and investing in foreign assets that yield an interest 
rate of i
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This is the interest-parity condition. This equation determines the off-shore exchange rate 
given the domestic and the foreign interest rate and the risk premium: An increase in 
domestic interest rates will raise the expected return from holding domestic-currency 
assets and this will make the off-shore exchange rate increase until the expected return 
from exiting the currency off shore is raised to equal the higher domestic currency 
interest rates: an increase of the foreign interest rate i* will have the converse effect of 
making the off-shore exchange rate fall in order to lower the return to exiting the  8
currency back to where it was before; an increase of the risk premium p will lower the 
off-shore exchange rate for the same reason; and finally, the higher is the expected future 
on-shore exchange rate 1
e
t E + , the higher is the off-shore exchange rate.  
  Together, equations (9), (10) and (12) determine the on-shore exchange rate E, the 
off-shore rate e and the volume of exports that shows up in the on-shore market X
L. The 
equations reveal that cutting interest rates has both a flow effect – captured by equation 
(10) – as well as a stock effect – capture by equation (12). Lower interest rates strengthen 
the exchange rate by reducing the required trade balance. This is the flow effect. But they 
also lower the expected return from holding domestic-currency assets which makes the 
off-shore exchange rate fall – when leakages increase – which lowers the volume of 
exports that go to the on-shore market X
L, which makes the on-shore exchange rate fall. It 
follows that cutting interest rates below the level that maximises the foreign-exchange 
revenue in Figure 1 may either strengthen or weaken the exchange rate. Note that 
stronger enforcement of capital controls – a higher level of t0 and t1 – will weaken the 
stock effect and make it more likely that the exchange rate increases following an interest 
rate reduction. 
  Starting from a high rate of interest, beyond the one generating maximum interest 
income in foreign currency in Figure 2, a fall in the rate of interest initially makes 
domestic assets more lucrative and hence reduces the supply of local currency off shore – 
while the interest income in foreign currencies iE is rising because E rises 
disproportionately with lower i – but, eventually, a further interest rate reduction will 
result in a lower interest income measured in foreign currency and this would tend to 
lower the exchange rate if the stock effect dominates the flow effect. This is shown in 
Figure 2. A falling interest rate may now cause the on-shore exchange rate to fall – if the 
stock effect of increased leakages dominates the effect of smaller flows of interest 
income – which makes the current- account constraint upward-sloping from the origin at 
low rates of interest. In this case the optimum for the local economy would entail a non-
zero rate of interest – since interest rates would be raised from a very low level to reduce 
the leakages and strengthen the exchange rate.  
  When we focus on the area where the Marshall-Lerner conditions are satisfied, 
raising interest rates will always make the off-shore exchange rate increase but will either  9
make the on-shore increase – if the stock effect dominates – or decrease – if the flow 
effect dominates. This is shown in Figure 3. 
 
3. A macroeconomic model 
 
We start by summarizing the equations that determine the on-shore exchange rate E, the 
off-shore exchange rate e and the volume of exports that show up on shore X
L. The only 
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The first equation describes the current-account constraint (CA) while the second one has 
the interest parity constraint (IP).  
  We can easily add the two equations to a traditional macroeconomic model. Assume 
that demand determines output and that demand depends on output Y, the domestic 
interest rate i and the real exchange rate E. Also assume a horizontal LM curve given by 
the policy rate 
  
p ii =           LM                                                        (13) 
Add an IS curve that has output Y as a function of demand which depends on the 
domestic rate of interest, output, the exchange rate E and a fiscal parameter F. 
   () ,,, YD i Y E F =                                                   (14) 
We now have a system of four equations in four endogenous variables; output, the 
domestic rate of interest, the on-shore exchange rate and the off-shore exchange rate. The 
general equilibrium is shown in Figure 4. 
    Changes in the central bank policy rate have a threefold effect on the on-shore 
exchange rate. A higher interest rate – represented by an upward shift of the horizontal 
LM curve – may reduce demand and make output contract which then makes the volume 
of imports fall which makes the currency appreciate since the current account will now be 
balanced at a higher exchange rate. This is the income effect. Second, the higher interest 
rate raises the return to holding domestic assets which makes the off-shore exchange rate  10
increase due to a reduction in the supply of the domestic currency in the off-shore market. 
This will tend to strengthen the on-shore exchange rate when exporters turn to the on 
shore market. This is the stock effect. Finally, the higher interest rate puts downward 
pressure on the on-shore exchange rate by raising the flow of interest income going 
through the current account since a lower exchange rate is necessary to create a larger 
trade surplus so as to accommodate the higher interest payments to foreigners. This is the 
flow effect.  
  Clearly, the size of the income effect depends on the slope of the IS curve and the 
elasticity of imports with respect to the exchange rate. With a steep IS curve and a low 
elasticity, the income effect becomes unimportant. The size of the stock effect depends 
on the effectiveness of the capital controls t1. The effect is small when the controls are 
more effective because exporters will not be as willing to buy the local currency off shore. 
Finally, the flow effect depends on the elasticities of imports and exports with respect to 
the exchange rate.  
 
4. Discussion 
High interest rates help strengthen the exchange rate in a capita-control regime by 
lowering aggregate demand and inducing foreign investors – trapped by the capital 
controls – not to try too hard to evade the controls. However, they create a flow of 
interest income that when converted into foreign currency puts downward pressure on the 
exchange rate. This is the transfer problem discussed by Keynes in the 1920s.
6  
  During a financial crisis when households are paying off their debt, the higher interest 
rates may not lower demand much and the effect of interest rates on leakages is uncertain 
and certainly declining in the intensity of monitoring of the capital controls. It is hence 
quite possible that high interest rates put downward pressure on the exchange rate. 
  Starting from very high interest rates, the lowering of rates will raise the interest 
income of foreign investors measured in foreign currency due to an appreciation of the 
domestic currency, caused by a smaller flow of interest income into the foreign-exchange 
market. In this case, the lowering of interest rates will benefit both the home country as 
well as the foreign investors. A further reduction of interest rates will harm the foreign 
                                                 
6 See Keynes (1929).  11
investors, but may benefit the local economy. The reduction will benefit the local 
economy when there are no leakages – both because of lower interest payments in 
domestic currency but also because of smaller interest payments being converted into 
foreign exchange which will raise the exchange rate – but may hurt the local economy if 
leakages are increased by making the currency depreciate. In this case the effect of 
increased leakages on the exchange rate – making it depreciate – dominates the effect of 
a reduced flow of interest income – which generates an appreciation. It follows that 
raising rates at low levels may strengthen the exchange rate in the presence of leakages 
but will always weaken the exchange rate in the absence of leakages. There are two 
effects at work; the stock effect causes a currency appreciation while the flow effect 
causes a depreciation of the currency.  
  With leakages, the off-shore exchange rate is affected by changes on the supply side 
and the demand side. The off-shore exchange rate is increasing in the interest income on 
domestic assets measured in foreign currency; it is decreasing in the foreign rate of 
interest; and decreasing in the risk premium on domestic assets. It follows that a falling 
spread between the on-shore and the off-shore exchange rates can be caused by a reduced 
risk premium that reduces the supply of the local currency in the off-shore market or by 
exporters using the off-shore market to a greater extent by demanding more units of the 
local currency due to a less effective enforcement of the capital controls.  
  In conclusion, one must be careful when applying the policy of high interest rates in a 
capital-control regime and carefully monitor all stocks and flows to see if the high 
interest rates are operating to strengthen or weaken the exchange rate.  
 
5. Iceland’s experience with capital controls and high interest rates 
Iceland was hit particularly severely by the global credit crunch. In the years preceding 
the crash, the country experienced one of the world’s most rapid credit expansions when 
the balance sheets of the country’s three largest banks grew from one year’s GDP to nine 
year’s GDP in just over four years. This expansion in banks’ balance sheets was 
accompanied by an expansion of the balance sheets of businesses that became 
increasingly leveraged over the same period, usually in foreign-currency denominated 
loans (80% of total business debt to domestic depository institutions). Domestic asset  12
prices reflect this development; the stock market grew by a factor of nine over a period of 
four years, the currency appreciated and house prices more than doubled.  
This development came to an end when the banks could no longer borrow wholesale 
in international credit markets starting in late 2007. Their situation became increasingly 
dire until Monday morning, the 29
th of September, when the Central Bank explained that 
the smallest of the three large banks had approached the bank for help because of an 
anticipated liquidity problem in the middle of October. Lacking confidence in the 
collateral offered, the Central Bank decided to buy 75% of its shares at a very low price, 
leaving the bank few options but to accept. The part nationalization undermined 
confidence in the Icelandic banking system. The immediate effect was to cause credit 
lines to be withdrawn from the two remaining banks. One of them experienced a run on 
one of its foreign branch and collapsed while the other was brought down by the actions 
of the British government. The foreign exchange market collapsed on October 8
th. The 
closing of the international part of the payment system immediately affected foreign trade, 
importers could not pay suppliers and exporters could not transfer funds to Iceland to 
meet domestic costs. The crisis spread quickly to the nonfinancial sector of the economy. 
Between 33-60% of non-financial firms became technically bankrupt; and a large swath 
of industries and employment – based on an abundance of borrowed money and a high 
exchange rate – became obsolete overnight, setting in motion a sudden rise of structural 
unemployment.  
  The Icelandic authorities eventually requested assistance from the International 
Monetary Fund. The IMF published in November 2008 their analysis of the crisis and the 
only published official plan on how to respond to it.
7 The plan lays out the objectives of 
monetary policy, fiscal policy and the restructuring process for the banking sector. The 
IMF program aims at stabilizing the exchange rate by a combination of high interest rates 
and severe capital controls that are planned to be gradually dismantled; to foster a 
banking system and protect relations with foreign financial institutions by the adoption of 
a strategy that is nondiscriminatory and collaborative; and, finally, to organize fiscal 
consolidation in light of the much greater anticipated level of public indebtedness. With 
                                                 
7 International Monetary Fund, Iceland, Request for Stand-By Arrangement, November 25, 2008 
(see http://www.sedlabanki.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=6606).  13
the program came a rescue package worth around $5.2 billion from the IMF and several 
countries.
8  
One problem preventing a return to a floating exchange rate is the substantial amount 
of foreign speculative capital remaining in Iceland. If the exchange rate were to float, the 
expectation is that a substantial amount of funds would flow out, causing a large and 
sustained fall in the exchange rate, which would have further damaging effects on firms’ 
balance sheets. In accordance with the IMF program, the Icelandic authorities imposed 
extensive capital controls in November 2008. Capital controls undoubtedly help solve the 
immediate problems facing the currency. Policy rates were raised before the IMF 
program was implemented on 24 October from 12% to 18%. This is perhaps the most 
controversial part of the program and the topic of this paper. The subsequent cautious 
lowering of the policy rate constitutes a natural experiment of the role of high interest 
rates in defending a currency under a capital control regime. 
The Central bank started monetary easing in March, which was justified by the 
rapidly declining inflation. It reduced its policy rate by 1% from 18% to 17% on 3 March, 
then by 1.5% to 15.5% on 7 April and finally to 13% on 6 May. Figure 4 shows the 
policy rate, the on-shore exchange rate and the off-shore exchange rate between 1 
September 2008 and 2 June 2009. Note that the euro/ISK exchange rate is fairly stable at 
around 0.60 euros in 100 kronur. However, the on-shore rate increased in February –
March before a monetary easing was started. Figure 6 shows the same variables for the 
period 1 March to 2 June 2009. Several observations can be made about the pattern of 
interest rate and exchange rate developments: 
 
•  The on-shore exchange rate started a gradual decline before the first interest rate 
reduction. 
•  The on-shore exchange rate has continued a very gradual decline following the 
three interest-rate reductions. 
•  The off-shore exchange rate has increased during the period of monetary easing.  
                                                 
8 See Letter of Intent, 15 November 2008 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2008/isl/111508.pdf) and the 
Stand-By Agreement (http://www.sedlabanki.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=6606). Of this, $2.1 billion 
comes from the IMF, which is much more than its country quota of $173.6 million. The stand-by 
arrangement amounts to 1,190 percent of Iceland’s quota.  14
 
The Central Bank engaged in substantial interventions in January and February, it then 
scaled back the interventions in March but resumed them in April and, especially, May. 
The extensive interventions in May suggest that the exchange rate would have ended up 
lower had the Bank not intervened. 
  The pattern of changes in the policy rate, the on-shore exchange rate and the off-
shore exchange rate can be used to discriminate between the different channels from 
interest rates to exchange rates, discussed in Section 3 above; the income effect, the stock 
effect and the flow effect. We get the income effect when a fall in interest rates makes 
consumption and imports increase which lowers the on-shore exchange rate. This makes 
exporters turn to the on-shore markets which then makes the off-shore exchange rate fall. 
This is clearly not what has happened, imports have fallen by 50% year-on-year, there 
has been no reversal in this decline in recent months, and the off-shore exchange rate has 
not fallen. The stock effect is generated when a fall in domestic interest rates makes 
foreign owners of local assets attempt to sell the local currency off shore. However, this 
would make the off-shore exchange rate fall, which has not happened. Finally, lower 
interest payments to foreigners will make the on-shore exchange rate increase, which 
makes exporters turn to the off shore market which makes the off-shore exchange rate 
rise. This will happen gradually. However, the foreign owners choose when to convert 
the interest payments into foreign currency and this is not instantaneous. Moreover, cuts 
in the policy rate only affect the payments to foreign owners of local-currency assets 
gradually because some of the assets are long-term government bonds. For both reasons, 
it would be unrealistic to expect the exchange rate to strengthen soon after the policy rate 
is cut. However, this effect must eventually show up in the data. One can conclude that 
the evolution of the on-shore and the off-shore exchange rate does not suggest that the 
interest rate cuts have lowered the on-shore exchange rate. 
  Turning to other causal factors, lower foreign interest rates would reduce the supply 
of the domestic currency off shore which would make the off-shore rate increase, which 
would induce exporters to turn to the on-shore market so that the on-share exchange rate 
would also increase. This has clearly not happened. Expectations of currency 
depreciation on shore would have led to increased leakages and a fall in the off-shore rate  15
as well as a fall of the on-shore rate. This explanation can be discounted because the off-
shore rate has not decreased.  
  This leaves us with one remaining possibility, which is that lax enforcing of the 
capital controls has resulted in a rising level of evasions. These circumventions or 
leakages show up in rising demand for local currency off shore and falling demand on 
shore which explains why the currency has depreciated on shore and appreciated off 
shore. The circumventions may be caused by a lack of trust in the domestic economy, 
especially the banking system. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has derived the relationship between central bank interest rates and exchange 
rates under a capital control regime. The on-shore exchange rate is determined by the 
requirement of a balance on the current account. 
  Higher interest rate may strengthen the currency on shore by reducing consumption 
and imports. They may also induce foreign owners of local currency assets not to sell 
local currency off shore which will make the off-shore exchange rate rise which then 
discourages exporters from buying local currency off shore which raises the supply of 
foreign currency on shore and strengthens the exchange rate. There is also an effect that 
goes in the opposite direction: Higher interest rates increase the flow of interest income to 
foreigners through the current account which makes the on-shore exchange rate fall 
which then makes exporters turn to the on-shore market lowering the off-shore rate. 
  The historical financial crisis now under way in Iceland provides excellent testing 
grounds for the effect of high interest rates accompanied by capital controls. Starting 
from a policy rate of 18% in February 2009, a sequence of interest rate reductions in the 
past three months have been accompanied by a reduction of the on-shore exchange rate 
and an increase of the off-shore exchange rate – the difference between the on-shore and 
the off-shore exchange rate has shrunk. These observations are inconsistent with the 
income effect and the stock effect which would predict that lower interest rates put 
downward pressure on the off-shore exchange rate. The flow effect must however be at 
work and will show up in a stronger exchange rate in the future.   16
  The current pattern of on-shore and off-shore exchange rates is consistent with 
increased leakages brought about by lax enforcing of capital controls and learning about 
ways of circumventing the controls. This suggests a strong reason to increase the level of 
monitoring and enforcing of the capital controls. Overall, the experience does not suggest 
that cutting interest rates moderately from a very high level is likely to make a currency 
depreciate in a capital control regime but highlights the importance of effective enforcing 
of the controls.  
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The bold current-account constraint shows all the combinations of i and E that give a balance on 
the current account. The iso-interest curves give all combinations of i and E that leave the foreign 
investor indifferent – give the same flow of interest income measured in foreign currency – and 
the iso-income curves give all combinations of i and E that leave the home country as well off in 
terms of the national income net of interest payments measured in foreign currency. At F the 
interest income of foreign investors, measured in foreign currency, is maximised, while the home 
country is best off at point L where the interest rate is equal to zero and the currency is appreciated 































This figure differs from Figure 1 in that the bold current-account constraint is upward sloping to 
the left of F because raising interest rates at low rate of interest will make the currency appreciate 





















This figure shows the relationship between domestic interest rates i, the on-shore exchange rate E 
and the off-shore exchange rate e. Raising the interest rate increases the rate of return to assets 
denominated in the local currency which makes the off-shore exchange rate increase so that the 
expected return on staying in the local currency or leaving via the off-shore market remain the 
same. The effect of the interest rate increase on the on-shore exchange rate is ambiguous. Higher 
interest rates cause a larger flow of interest payment going through the current account which 
makes the currency depreciate. This is the flow effect. However, the higher off-shore exchange 
rate may cause more exporters to convert their foreign currency on shore which would strengthen 
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Figure 4. General equilibrium 
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  Figure 6. Monetary easing 
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